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NATIONAL JURISDICTION AND
THE USE OF THE SEA
LEWIS M. ALEXANDER*
I
JURISDICTIONAL ZONES OF THE SEA
The limits of jurisdiction of the United States differ with respect
to each of the three physical environments of the nation. On land,
jurisdiction ends at our boundaries with Canada and Mexico. In
space, international law does not yet recognize any specific limits
to national sovereignty, although there is acknowledged to be a
zone of outer space well away from the earth's surface to which a
country's jurisdiction does not extend. In the sea there are national
boundaries for different purposes, and beyond these boundaries
various forms of control may still prevail. To the United States, as
to other maritime countries, the nature and extent of its jurisdiction
in the marine environment is of prime importance because of the
effects this jurisdiction has on our opportunites for use of the sea's
resources.
1
The term "resource" is used here to refer both to goods and to
services from the sea. Marine resources differ in several respects
from those of the land. One difference is the three-dimensional
nature of the sea itself, permitting activities to take place simul-
* Deputy Director, Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources,
Washington, D.C.
1. The problems of utilizing the marine environment led to the formation in 1966
of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, and in
early 1967 of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources-the
latter body charged with recommending to the President and to Congress a national
oceanographic program that will meet present and future national needs. The author
is currently serving as a member of the Commission staff. Nothing in this article should
be construed in any way as reflecting opinions of the Marine Science Commission or of
the Marine Council.
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taneously on the surface and within the water, as well as on and
under the seabed. A second difference is the high mobility of many
of the marine resources, and of the water medium itself. Finally,
within a country's land boundaries, political control over resources
is exclusive in the sense that no other nation has rights to them; in
the sea, however, rights to resources may be shared or "common
property" in nature, thus adding new dimensions to jurisdictional
problems.2 This article discusses the nature and extent of our off-
shore jurisdiction in terms of the major uses we make of the marine
environment.
The ocean areas of the globe have traditionally been divided into
two basic components: the high seas which are free to the use of all
countries, and the marginal seas over which coastal states exercise
jurisdiction. Events in recent decades have served to complicate this
division. Questions of national jurisdiction have been extended to
the seabed and subsoil of the oceans, and to the airspace above
them. New technologies and new uses of the marine environment
have brought with them new pressures for extensions of national
controls well away from the coast. These events have been aug-
mented by political trends-the conflict of ideologies, the achieve-
ment of independence by many countries, the pressures of popula-
tion on world food supplies-with the result that concern is grow-
ing in many quarters that the traditional freedom of the high seas
will be gradually eroded away by national claims. These claims, in
turn, rest on the real or imagined needs that governments feel they
have for protection in their offshore waters from the competition of
foreigners.
United States policy on jurisdictional matters in the marine en-
vironment rests on two principal bases: the international regulations
contained in the four Geneva Conventions, and the bilateral and
multilateral agreements which this nation has made with other states
concerning specific uses of the sea. The four Conventions were
adopted at the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference, to which
82 countries sent delegations.' These Conventions have been ratified
2. A shared resource may belong to two or more nations, but a common property
resource falls within the purview of no particular nation, and thus all countries are
free to share in its exploitation.
3. The four Conventions were: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and Convention on the Continental Shelf.
See, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Off. Rec., U.N. Doc. A/C 13/
1-43 (1958).
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by a sufficient number of governments so that they are now in
effect.4
The Conventions provide for the partitioning of the oceans into
five jurisdictional zones. First is the zone of internal waters, includ-
ing certain bays, estuaries, and other adjacent waters, over which a
coastal state exercises complete sovereignty. Seaward of this is the
territorial sea, over which the sovereignty of the coastal state is
limited only by the right of innocent passage by foreign vessels.
There is no agreement among states on a standard breadth for the
territorial sea. In late 1967, of 92 states which claimed a definite
breadth for their territorial waters, 28 (including the United States)
claimed three miles, 33 (including the Soviet Union) claimed twelve
miles, and 24 adopted breadths between three and twelve miles.
The remaining 7 had territoral claims in excess of twelve miles.5
Beyond territorial limits is the contiguous zone, in which coastal
states may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish in-
fringements of their customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regula-
tions." The contiguous zone may not extend more than twelve miles
seaward of the base-line from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured; thus, countries which claim twelve miles as their
territorial limit are not entitled to an additional contiguous zone.
Equally important is the fact that many countries, including the
United States, now consider their contiguous zone to be also an
exclusive fisheries area in which foreign fishing is prohibited except
by special agreement.7 Some 28 states with territorial breadths of
less than twelve miles have extra-territorial fisheries zones out to
the twelve-mile limit.8
A fourth jurisdictional zone is the continental shelf, the shallow
4. By the end of 1967, thirty-three states had ratified the Territorial Sea Convention,
forty had ratified the High Seas Convention, twenty-five had ratified the Fishing Con-
vention, and thirty-six had ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
5. See the complete table of offshore claims in Alexander, Geography and the Law
of the Sea, 58 Annals, Ass'n of Am. Geographers 177 (1968).
6. Controls exist over these infringements only if they are committed within the
coastal state's territory or territorial sea.
7. Under an Agreement of November, 1967, with the U.S.S.R., Soviet vessels are
permitted to fish within a designated area in the 3-12 mile zone off the New Jersey
coast between January 1 and April 1 of each year. In addition, both Soviet and Jap-
anese fishing vessels are permitted under certain conditions to fish between 3 and 12
miles off portions of the Alaskan coast. See the February 13, 1967, Agreement with the
Soviet Union, and the May 9, 1967, Agreement with Japan.
8. Combining these 28 with the 33 countries claiming a twelve-mile territorial sea
brings to 61 the number of countries (out of a total of 111 independent states bordering
on the sea) which prohibit foreigners from fishing within twelve miles of their shores.
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platform extending out from the land for varying distances beneath
the sea. Three physical variables here are (1) that the depth at
which the gentle incline of the shelf breaks to a more precipitous
slope varies considerably from place to place, (2) that the distance
from shore at which this "edge" of the shelf occurs also varies
greatly throughout the world, and (3) that in some localities there
are deep basins or canyons in the shelf, seaward of which are addi-
tional shallow areas. The 1958 Geneva delegates, seeking agree-
ment on identifying the shelf, defined it as "the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploita-
tion of the national resources of the said areas." This definition also
applies to submarine areas adjoining the coasts of islands. Over its
continental shelf, the coastal state exercises sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources.
The fifth zone constitutes the high seas, which are open to all
nations. Specifically, countries are guaranteed the following four
freedoms on the high seas: freedom of navigation; freedom of fish-
ing; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; and freedom to
fly over the high seas. In addition, there are other freedoms that are
"recognized by the general principles of international law." No-
where in the Geneva Conventions is reference made to the legal
status of the seabed and subsoil underlying the high seas beyond the
limits of the continental shelf.
Although the Conventions represent a decisive forward step in
the formulation of the international law of the sea there still remain
many problems of ambiguity. Some matters were left unresol'ed by
the Geneva Conventions. Others, although covered by the Conven-
tion articles, are subject to wide differences of interpretation. In
still other cases, it may in time prove wise to seek revision of certain
articles in the light of changing technological or economic condi-
tions. These ambiguities will be discussed in terms of specific uses
which the United States makes of the sea.
II
USES OF THE SEA
In considering the major uses made of the sea by the United States
we start by noting the principal categories of uses for which juris-
dictional problems involving foreigners may be important. These
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categories are transportation, commercial fishing, mining, scientific
research, and military operations. Each will be treated separately
in terms of uncertainties regarding national jurisdiction.
J. Transportation
Although freedom of navigation on, and flight over, the high
seas is guaranteed by the Geneva High Seas Convention, limitations
may arise with respect to marginal waters off a nation's coastline.
The three sets of conditions under which this might occur are with
respect to the internal waters of a foreign state, to its territorial
waters, and to international straits.
Since innocent passage by foreign vessels is not guaranteed
through a state's internal waters a question arises as to the limits a
country may claim to such waters. The Geneva articles are quite
precise on the delimitation of the baseline marking the outer limits
of internal waters with respect to such matters as islands, low-tide
elevations, permanent harbor works, and the closing line to be used
across the mouths of bays.' The articles are less definite on the spe-
cial circumstances surrounding the delimitation of straight baselines
along the coast. Article 4 of the Territorial Sea Convention states:
"In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or
if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate
vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points
may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured."' Still, there is considerable room
for debate on what the Article authorizes in terms of specific base-
lines. If a coastal state follows a liberal interpretation in delimiting
its offshore boundaries, it may find itself challenged by other inter-
ested countries; such a challenge might eventually go to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, as occurred in the Anglo-Norwegian
Case.1'
9. A closing line, for example, could be drawn across the mouth of Cape Cod Bay,
where the distance from Plymouth to Provincetown is less than 24 miles. But this would
not be true in the case of Bristol Bay, Alaska, where the closing line is 160 miles.
10. The waters enclosed by these baselines are internal in nature. However, Article
5(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention states "where the establishment of a straight
baseline ... has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had
been considered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent
passage . . . shall exist in those waters." 3 Off. Rec., A/C. 13/39 (1958).
11. The United Kingdom challenged the Norwegian method for delimiting straight
baseline along its coasts in a case which eventually was decided in favor of Norway.
See Evensen, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and its Legal Consequences, 46
Am. J. Int'l L., 609 (1952).
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The Geneva delegates failed to agree on two related matters: the
definition of "historic bays," and the delimitation of straight base-
lines in the case of archipelagos. Some coastal states have claimed
that certain near-shore waters have traditionally been treated as a
part of the national domain, and, while they cannot be closed off as
internal under the delimitation systems spelled out in the Conven-
tions, they should nevertheless be recognized as coming within that
state's sovereignty. 12 A variation of this is the suggested "closed
sea" regimes, under which jurisdiction over an extensive water body,
such as the Black or Baltic Seas, would rest with the states which
border on them. In either case freedom of navigation in marginal
waters would be threatened.
The delimitation of straight baselines about archipelagos was
the subject of considerable debate, but no decisions, at the 1958
Geneva Conference. 13 The rationale for such delimitation appears to
rest on the fact that the inter-island waters form the connecting links
among a multi-island state, and that therefore they should be treated
as internal. Straight baselines have already been delimited about
Indonesia and the Philippines, and within these baselines the waters
are classed as internal. Among other recently-independent countries
are the Maldives and Western Samoa, both of which consist of
island groups, and which may in time seek straight baseline regimes
to close off inter-island waters.
Within its territorial waters a coastal state is entitled to suspend
the innocent passage of foreign ships "if such suspension is essential
for the protection of its security."' 4 Article 16 of the Territorial
Sea Convention goes on to note that such suspension must be tem-
porary in nature, apply to specified areas of the territorial sea, and
be "without discrimination against foreign ships." In fact, such de-
tails may be meaningless, as in the case of the blanket prohibitions
which have long been in effect against Israeli shipping within the
12. In 1963 the State of Alaska sought unsuccessfully to close off the waters of
Bristol Bay on the grounds of its "historic" nature. See Arctic Maid Fisheries, Inc. v.
State, Sup. Ct. of Alas., No. 316. Dismissed per stipulation, (1963). For general discus-
sions of the historic bay problem see L. J. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in Interna-
tional Law (1964), and M. P. Strohl, The International Law of Bays (1963).
13. A clear discussion of this problem is in Evensen, Certain Legal Aspects Con-
cerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, in 1 U.N. Conf.
on the Law of the Sea, supra, note 3. See also Sorensen, The Territorial Sea of Archi-
pelagos, 315, Questions of International Law: Presented to J. P. A. Francois on the
Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday (1959).
14. Freedom of navigation by American merchant vessels in foreign territorial
waters has not to date been impeded by any nation.
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territorial waters of the United Arab Republic. In a world of po-
litical turbulence and expanding territorial claims this right of sus-
pension of foreign shipping may in time prove to be an extremely
troublesome issue.
The case for international straits is also a complex one. Article
16 of the Territorial Sea Convention provides: "There shall be no
suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits
which are used for international navigation between one part of the
high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of
a foreign State." The article, however, fails to identify the criteria
for a strait "used for international navigation," nor, of course, does
it attempt to define "innocent passage."'" How long, for example,
need a strait be traversed by foreign ships in order to qualify as one
which is used for "international navigation"? If the country which
controls the strait in question feels that armed attack by its neighbor
is imminent, must it view with impunity the import of oil and other
supplies by its neighbor ?l" And what if one state has research vessels
off another's coasts and these vessels seek innocent passage through
coastal straits? The acquisition of oceanographic data may be re-
garded as inimical with innocent passage.
The use of international straits is closely tied to the question
of territorial limits. Obviously the number of straits lying entirely
within coastal states' territorial waters is far greater under a uni-
versal twelve-mile territorial regime than would be the case for
three or six miles. 17 Freedom of overflight is also involved here, for
15. In the summer of 1967 the Soviet Union refused permission for passage of U.S.
Coast Guard vessels "Edisto" and "East Wind" through the 23Y2-mile wide Vilkitsky
Straits south of Severnaya Zemlya, connecting the Kara and Laptev Seas. The Soviet
action was apparently based on the contention that these were warships and that ad-
vance notification was required of such ships. Although the Soviets gave no reason
for their refusal one interpretation might be that since the vessel was carrying out
oceanographic research in the waters north of the U.S.S.R., its purpose in seeking
passage was not "innocent" but rather to seek data on the nature of the inter-island
passage.
16. The dispute in the spring of 1967 over the right of Israeli shipping to use the
Strait of Tiran into the Gulf of Aqaba pointed up some of the difficulties surrounding
Article 16, including the difficulty of enforcing its provisions. For a background of this
dispute see Selak, .4 Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba, 52 Am.
J. Int'l L. 660 (1958), and Passage Through the Suez Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo
and Israel Ships 51 J. Int'l L. 530 (1957). Also Gross, Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea and the Right of Innocent Passage through the Gulf of Aqaba 53 J. Int'l L. 564
(1959).
17. Kennedy, A Brief Geographical and Hydrographical Study of Straits 'which
Constitute Routes for International Traffic, in U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea 114,
supra note 3. See also Table III, Widths of Selected Straits and Channels in Sover-
eignty of the Sea, U.S. Department of State, Geographic Bulletin No. 3 (1965).
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there may or may not be a strip of high seas waters extending
through the straits.
Still another transportation problem is that of the "genuine link"
requirement in shipping registry which holds that a state "must
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag." Many vessels,
operating under "flags of convenience" are owned by nationals of
one state but registered in another.18 One important question is
whether a state may challenge the practices of another country in
granting nationality to vessels on the grounds that the necessary
"genuine link" between flag and ownership does not exist.'9 The
United States is particularly vulnerable in this respect since it is
the principal country making use of "flags of convenience" arrange-
ments.
B. Commercial Fishing
A second use of the sea by the United States is for fishing. In this
use the industry has a political importance-both domestically and
internationally-well in excess of its relative economic significance
to the nation's economy. The value of the domestic catch in 1966
was $454 million, while that of fishery processed products was $1.2
billion,2 0 as against a total gross national product for that year of
$740 billion.
The nation's commercial catch has remained rather stable over
the past thirty years, fluctuating between 4.3 and 5.4 billion pounds.
During the same period the total world fish catch has more than
trebled, resulting in a decline of the United States' position from
second to sixth among the fishing nations. Conversely, the demand
for fisheries products in the United States has been growing steadily,
18. See B. A. Boczek, Flags of Convenience (1962). This problem is closely associ-
ated with that of pollution by ships, either within or beyond a coastal state's territorial
limits. In the case of the March, 1967, Torrey Canyon disaster off southwestern Eng-
land the vessel was registered in Liberia but owned by an American company and
chartered to a British concern.
19. A discussion of this "genuine link" problem is given in McDougal &. Burke,
The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea 1008-
1141 (1962). The authors feel that "Registration alone . . . recommends itself . . . as
the appropriate 'link' in attribution of national character, between state and ship."
20. Data for the domestic catch is from Fisheries of the United States, 1966 (Wash-
ington: United States Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Commercial Fisheries, C. F. S. 4400, 1967).
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so that by 1966 some 65 per cent of our fishery products (valued at
$724 million) was imported."
Despite the failure of the fishing industry to expand the volume
of catch, its interests remain of critical importance to the United
States for the following reasons: (1) fishing activities on the high
seas carry with them implications of national security and prestige;
(2) there are strong psychological and political connotations in the
industry; (3) there are international implications in "food from
the sea" programs which the United States has inaugurated. The
security/prestige factor of commercial fisheries may be seen in the
training of seamen provided for by the industry, the knowledge of
the marine environment gained from fishing operations, the use of
fishing vessels in wartime, and, from the standpoint of prestige, the
negative values provided by the appearance of large technologically-
efficient foreign fishing vessels which compete for the catch with
smaller American vessels in waters close to our coasts. The psycho-
logical/political element is evident in the traditional appeal of our
fisheries operations and in the role of congressmen from Alaska,
Washington, Massachusetts and other states in seeking to protect
the interests of American coastal fishermen. The international im-
plications center on the expectations in many countries of develop-
ing the untapped food potential in the sea for their expanding
populations. 22
The gap between myth and reality may at times be a broad one,
but the facts are: first, that the United States has the potential for
an economically-viable fishing industry; and second, that such an in-
dustry, to flourish, must have access to the fisheries resources beyond
the present national limits. The twin problems should be attacked
simultaneously; without the one the other loses much of its rationale.
The bulk of the United States' catch comes from the coastal
21. Balanced against this figure were exports valued at $85 million. In 1966 we
imported 53 per cent of our edible fishery products, and 75 per cent of industrial fishery
products (used for fish meal, fish oil, etc.).
22. Much has been written on the potential of the sea. See, for example, Schaefer,
The Potential Harvest of the Sea, 94 Transactions of the Am. Fisheries Soc'y 923
(1965) and Chapman, Food Production from the Sea and the Nutritional Requirements
of the World, Conference on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean
(1967). In contrast to the present world harvest of some 66 million metric tons, esti-
mates of the fisheries potential of the sea range from 200 million to 2 billion tons. It
has been calculated that a doubling of the current world catch, if this increase were
processed into Fish Protein Concentrate, would make up the animal protein deficiencies
for half the world's population.
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waters. Some 63 per cent of the average annual fishery by volume
in the 1959-1963 period was taken within twelve miles of the
American coast, representing 60 per cent of the total catch value.23
Another 17 per cent by volume, and 25 per cent by value was taken
in United States coastal waters beyond the twelve-mile limits, while
9 per cent by volume and 15 per cent by value was taken on the
high seas beyond our coastal waters. It has been estimated that on
a sustained yield basis some four times the present catch could be
harvested within twelve miles of the United States coast without
substantially changing present fishing methods.24 Much of the in-
crease would be in species not now economically valuable to the
American fishermen. 25 And, the catch in coastal waters beyond the
twelve-mile limit could potentially amount to ten times the quantity
United States fishermen are now harvesting from these areas,
although, again, reliance would have to be put on new types of
fisheries. 2
6
The pursuit of economic efficiency in the fishing industry has been
amply discussed by Crutchfield, Christy and Scott, Pontecorvo, and
others. Among the steps advocated for efficiency are limitations to
entry, repeal of state laws which support inefficient use, and removal
of the bans on the use of foreign vessels by United States fishermen.
The fishing industry, according to some proponents, is plagued by
too many small units, a lack of investment capital, and diversity of
interests among harvesters, processers, and marketers of fisheries
products. Because of internal divisions of interest the industry can-
not speak with one voice in Congress. Much of its equipment is out-
dated, and the industry is plagued by lack of federal support for
such programs as gear or technology improvements, or the develop-
ment of fish protein concentrate.
Not all the commercial fishing enterprise is experiencing eco-
nomic difficulties. The shrimp, tuna, and king crab fisheries are flour-
ishing, but in each case there is a unique aspect of the resource avail-
23. Statistics supplied by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries.
24. Statement by Donald L. McKernan, then Director of the Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, Fish Protein Concentrate Hearings on S.2720 Before the Committee on Com-
merce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1966).
25. Among these are anchovies, blue crab and oysters.
26. Supra note 24. Among under-utilized species beyond the twelve-mile limit are
thread herring, hake, jack mackerel, and shrimp.
27. Biological and Economic Aspects of Fisheries Management (J. Crutchfield ed.
1959) ; F. Christy & A. Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (1965) ; Ponte-
corvo, Regulation in the North Americn Lobster Fishery, in Economic Effect of Fishery
Regulation 239 (R. Hamlisch ed. 1962).
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ability." The salmon and halibut stocks are protected by treaty
against most foreign competition ;29 menhaden, oyster, and blue crab
resources exist for the most part within the twelve-mile limit. But the
haddock, cod, flounder, whiting, ocean perch, hake, scallop and other
fisheries are open to substantial harvesting by foreign vessels, and
in practically all the American fisheries, economists argue, there has
been too great an effort applied in terms of the total returns avail-
able to the fishermen.80
The United States is involved in nine international commissions
and conventions designed to regulate various fisheries in the inter-
ests of conservation. It has bilateral agreements with Canada, Mex-
ico, Japan, and the Soviet Union regarding details of fisheries op-
erations off the United States coasts; through United Nations
agencies and other international bodies we participate in the growing
number of regional and world-wide organizations designed to re-
search and administer various aspects of the world fisheries re-
sources. But the persistent question remains: Is the United States
doing enough to uphold its long-term interests in fisheries exploita-
tion ?31
These interests might be thought of in terms of (1) strengthen-
ing the economic structure of our domestic industry, (2) assuring
the industry a reasonable share of the catch beyond our national
limits, and (3) making available greater amounts of the sea's food
28. The king crab is considered by the U.S. Government as a natural resource of
the shelf over which this nation has exclusive exploitation rights (although agreements
with Japan and the Soviet Union permit these nations a certain level of catch each
year in the Gulf of Alaska). There have been no serious overfishing or foreign compe-
tition problems to date in the shrimp industry. The Eastern Pacific tuna is also largely
dominated by the U.S., although here annual quotas have had to be established for the
yellowfin tuna. See Kask, Present Arrangements for Fishery Exploitation, The Law of
the Sea: The Future of the Sea's Resources 56 (1968).
29. The 1952 International North Pacific Fisheries Convention, signed by Japan,
Canada, and the United States, provides for Japanese abstention from fishing for sal-
mon east of Longitude 1750 W., and for halibut and herring in certain waters between
this longitude and the North American coast. For an excellent discussion of this and
other North Pacific fisheries matters, see North Pacific Fisheries Symposium, 43 Wash.
L. Rev. (1967).
30. Economists agree that where there is no control over the number of fishermen,
the total cost of any fishery tends to match the total revenues, so that any sharable
profit becomes dissipated. See Crutchfield, Over-capitalization of the Fishing Effort, The
Law of the Sea: The Future of the Sea's Resources 23 (1968).
31. The problem of defining our interests is complicated by the possibility that the
nation might be better served by importing even higher percentages of our fishery
needs, and allowing uneconomic segments of the domestic fishing industry to gradually
disappear. But most persons acquainted with the industry still feel that the national
interest would best be served by attempting to aid and strengthen the industry, rather
than to abandon it.
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potential for developing nations. The first goal may involve a sub-
stantial rehabilitation of much of the domestic industry and the in-
troduction of limited-entry provisions into many of the fisheries.
The third objective can probably not be realized through the use of
fish harvested by Americans for the hungry nations since this fish is
too expensive. Rather, the interested nations themselves should be
encouraged to harvest, process, and distribute internally (or among
nearby developing countries) the fisheries products. The second goal
concerns us here since it involves extension of jurisdiction beyond the
twelve-mile limit.
There are several ways in which new authority over coastal fish-
eries could be established. We could extend our territorial limits out
to one or two hundred miles from shore and deny foreigners the
right to fish in these waters, except perhaps under special conditions.
Alternatively, we could extend our exclusive fisheries-rather than
territorial-limits out to this distance, or to the edge of the con-
tinental shelf; again, the freedom of foreigners to fish these waters
would be proscribed.32 In the case of an exclusive fisheries zone, the
"historic rights" of foreigners to fish these waters could be recog-
nized.8" Still another procedure would be to seek the right to enforce
unilateral conservation restrictions beyond the twelve-mile limit.
These restrictions might or might not discriminate against foreign
fishermen.8 4
32. According to some writers an extension of national sovereignty would be in-
volved in the proclamation of a territorial or exclusive-fishery zone. In the latter case,
certain restrictions on the movement of ships, aircraft, or submersibles would not apply.
But little serious thought has actually been given to the legal distinctions between the
two types of zones.
33. There is much diversity of opinion on the definition of "historic fishing rights."
How, for example, would a coastal state's historic rights (as in the case of some New
England groundfisheries) equate with the rights of foreign fishermen? Definitions of
historic rights were included in the final American-Canadian Proposal at 1960 Geneva
Law of the Sea Conference and in the 1964 European Fisheries Convention. For the
former, see Second United Nations' Conference on the Law of the Sea: Off. Rec.
U.N. Doc. A/C 19/8 (1960). A description of the Fisheries Convention is in Develop-
ments in the Law of the Sea, 1958-64, British Institute of Int'l and Comparative L.
(1965).
34. Two points are involved in the problem of unilateral conservation measures
proclaimed by the coastal state. One is that the measures may apply to stocks which
foreigners are more actively exploiting than the coastal state's fishermen (i.e., tuna off
Peru), and the foreigners may have no recourse for presenting their arguments that
the conservation measures are without scientific justification. A second point is that the
coastal state may deliberately restrict foreign efforts (through licensing, quotas, or
other means) while not imposing commensurate restraints on its own nationals beyond
the twelve-mile limit. The variations in these types of discriminatory practices are al-
most limitless.
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Suggestions have been made that the high seas fisheries be placed
under international control, on a world-wide or a regional basis. 5
Recourse might be made to the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fish-
ing, to which the United States is a party. Under this Convention,
if a country feels a coastal stock beyond territorial limits is threat-
ened by overfishing, it has the right unilaterally to invoke conserva-
tion measures which are applicable to both domestic and foreign
fishing, as long as those measures do not discriminate against
foreign fishermen."' The machinery set up by the Geneva Fisheries
Convention has never been implemented, nor, according to some
experts, is it likely to be put to the test in the near future. 37
Care should be taken to distinguish between conservation agree-
ments which limit the total catch without affecting the question of
who gets how much of the combined harvest, and allocation systems
which guarantee states a specified share of the total catch. Some
"national quota" schemes would reserve a fixed amount of the catch
under any circumstances to the coastal state, presumably on the
basis of propinquity; other schemes would determine the coastal
states's rights to high seas fisheries near its shores on the basis of
long-standing investments, need, or economic dependence on the
sea.
38
Operationally, the United States, to date, has depended on a
series of bilateral and multilateral agreements to provide protection
35. A principal rationale for this proposal is contained in F. Christy & A. Scott,
supra note 27. Because of the growing problems of competition and of economic waste
they argue that only through international management of high seas fisheries can ra-
tional exploitation of these resources be brought about. See also Christy, The Distribu-
tion of the Sea's Wealth in Fisheries, in The Law of the Sea: Offshore Boundaries and
Zones 106 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
36. Article 7 of the Fisheries Convention permits a coastal state to adopt unilateral
measures of conservation in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, but
laces this with many provisions, among them that there is urgent need for the conser-
vation measures "based on appropriate scientific findings" and that affected foreign
fishermen have the right to appeal to a special arbitral commission.
37. Herrington notes the limited membership of the Convention (twenty-five out of
a possible 130 or more states), the lack of provisions to handle the impact of massive
long-range fleet fishing on developed coastal fisheries, the absence of international en-
forcement provisions, and the need to accelerate action on imperative conservation
measures. Herrington, The Future of the Geneva Convention on Fishing and the Con-
servation of the Living Resources of the Sea, 62, The Law of the Sea: The Future of
the Sea's Resources 62 (1968). Also, The Convention on Fisheries and the Conservation
of Living Resources: Accomplishments of the 1958 Geneva Conference, 26, supra note 35.
38. The case for "special rights" is described in Garcia-Amador, The Exploitation
and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea (1963). See also the Resolution, Special
Situations Relating to Coastal Fisheries, adopted at the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea
Conference.
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against excess foreign competition in its offshore fisheries. Three
problems exist with respect to such agreements. First, since the
agreements are voluntary in nature, a large measure of "give and
take" may be involved, thus diminishing the advantages to be gained
from the protection which they seek to provide. A second problem is
that most such agreements are short-lived, requiring frequent re-
negotiations and concessions. A third is that such agreements are
binding only on signatory states; all other states are free to ignore
their provisions.
In the light of these difficulties might it not be wiser for the
United States to seek international recognition of this nation's
"special rights" to certain fisheries resources in its coastal waters
beyond the twelve-mile limit? Such rights might be based on our
long-term investments in coastal fisheries, on the economic depend-
ence of certain Northeastern and Northwestern areas (particularly
Alaska) on these fisheries, or simply on the concept that a coastal
nation has some general rights against excessive fishing by foreign-
ers in its coastal waters. One system for recognizing these rights
would be the assignment of quotas of the total maximum sustainable
yield of valuable species to the coastal state and to foreign coun-
tries.8 9 When each participating country has reached the limit of
its assigned quota it would cease fishing that particular species until
the following year. This system already exists between the United
States and Canada, and between the Soviet Union and Japan, with
respect to Pacific salmon.
Crutchfield, in discussing this national quota approach, notes some
of its inherent difficulties, including the recognition of the historic
rights of countries which have traditionally exploited the fishery,
and the allocation of quotas to future entrants into the fishery.4 ° The
39. The validity of the maximum sustainable yield concept has been hotly debated.
Theoretically, there is some point in the extent of a fishery where the annual harvest,
together with the mortality due to natural predators, combine to limit the species
to merely reproducing its number year after year. But Crutchfield, among others, feels
that maximum sustainable yield "is a thoroughly ambiguous term" and "that the func-
tion relating the yield of organic marine products to harvesting efforts does not neces-
sarily reach a peak and thereafter decline as the rate of exploitation increases." Crutch-
field, Zones of National Interest: Convention on Fishing and Living Resources of the
High Seas, 1967 A.B.A. Symposium on Marine Resources (in press). For Crutchfield,
and other economists, a more meaningful limit is the point of maximum net economic
yield, that is, the point where the difference between total costs of production and total
revenue is greatest. (But see Schafer's counter arguments, The Law of the Sea: The
Future of the Sea's Resources 128 (1968).
40. See his excellent article, Management of the North Pacific Fisheries: Economic
Objectives and Issues 43 Wash. L. Rev. 283 (1967).
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costs to the coastal state of surveillance and enforcement of such a
program may be high. An additional problem is that of acceptability
of such a regime by all interested parties. What would countries
such as the Soviet Union, Japan, and Poland, for example, have to
gain from the adoption of a national quota system in the fisheries off
the United States coasts, if this guaranteed the United States as
large, or a larger, share of valuable species than it now obtains? One
answer, Crutchfield suggests, might lie in "possible trade-offs, not
only in fisheries but with respect to other interests. ' 41
Three possible approaches oppose any type of unilateral exten-
sion by the United States of its fisheries jurisdiction beyond the
twelve-mile limits. A first would hold that not enough now is known
about our coastal fisheries to justify specific regulations; what we
need now is more fisheries research, not more restrictions.42 A
second argument would be that such extension might jeopardize the
interests of the shrimp and tuna industries which fish close to the
shores of other nations, and whose value of catch stood first and
third respectively among United States fisheries in 1966."3 Finally,
it could be argued that seaward extensions of fisheries jurisdictions
throughout the world could lead to serious underutilization of
stocks, since many countries might not permit foreigners to harvest
underexploited fisheries within the proscribed zones.
Political pressures in the United States may well force the govern-
ment in coming years to take action against the increasing number of
foreign vessels operating off our coasts. If ad hoc concessions and
agreements prove inadequate to the task of protecting what the
coastal fishing industry feels to be its legitimate rights, then some
unilateral actions may be considered. The establishment of a
national quota system for selected species is probably the least dras-
tic of such actions. These quotas would apply to the total catch of
the affected species, both within and beyond the twelve-mile limit.
How the quotas would be determined is, of course, a focal prob-
lem in this system. For some fisheries, such as Pacific salmon and
halibut, the United States and Canada have successfully pursued an
"abstention" arrangement under which they alone share in the
41. Ibid. at 307.
42. See, e.g., Chapman, Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters 87, supra note 35.
43. The 200-mile claims of Peru, Chile and Ecuador have long plagued the Ameri-
can tuna fishermen. United States protests have been of no avail and the vessels' own-
ers are now buying licenses to fish within the 200-mile limit. Any extension of Ameri-
can fisheries claims might not only encourage these countries but also Caribbean nations
(off whose coasts shrimp vessels fish) to extend their jurisdictional claims.
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harvest, on the basis of past conservation measures. 44 But the
American share of the catch of Atlantic haddock, cod, and other
groundfish is declining in the face of foreign activities. Our historic
rights here, and in the hake, saury, and pollock fisheries, are less
well-established. The allocation of national quotas would presum-
ably come from international negotiations among the interested
countries. Tortuous as this process might be, the alternatives could
be worse: depletion and possible destruction of the resources;
gradual "freeze-out" of American fishermen beyond the twelve-mile
limit; or unilateral extension of United States claims to exclusive
fisheries well out into the oceans.45
C. Mining
The principal jurisdictional problems related to mining on and
beneath the floor of the sea involve the determination of the outer
limits of the continental shelf, and the possible regimes to be
adopted for the deep ocean floor beyond these limits. As noted
earlier the Continental Shelf Convention defines the shelf as being
"adjacent to the coast" and extending seaward to the isobath of 200
meters (656 feet) or beyond "to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources." This
definition tends to be open-ended, depending on the use of the terms
''exploitation" and "adjacent." Existing technology would permit
the exploitation of minerals from the floor of the sea in at least
6,000 feet of water and probably more. But the costs of such
operations are prohibitive; thus, the limits of exploitability (at least
for the United States) are economic in nature, rather than techno-
logical.
Assuming (1) that the term "exploitability" has a commercial
connotation, (2) that the depths to which jurisdiction extend for
one state also apply to all other states, (3) that the areas to be
exploited must be "adjacent" to the claimant's coast, and (4) that
44. The "abstention" principle is based on the following three conditions: (1) evi-
dence indicating that more extensive exploitation of a stock will not provide a substan-
tial increase in yield; (2) the exploitation of the stock is limited or otherwise regulated
for the purpose of maintaining or increasing its maximum sustainable productivity;
(3) the stock is the subject of extensive scientific study designed to discover whether it
is being fully utilized, and the conditions necessary for maintaining its maximum sus-
tained productivity.
45. In addition to problems of conserving and distributing the catch among dif-
ferent nations are those of conflict of gear. For an excellent discussion of such conflicts
off the U.S. coast see Wedin, Impact of Distant Water on Coastal Fisheries, The Law
of the Sea: The Future of the Sea's Resources 14 (1968).
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the framers of the 1958 Convention presumed that there was some
ultimate limit to the continental shelf, and, if we accept the proposi-
tion that commercial exploitation must actually be taking place be-
yond the 200-meter isobath in order for countries to extend their
claims to the shelf on the grounds of exploitability, then the problem
of jurisdiction in deep waters may be some years away. The deepest
commercial recovery of oil off the United States is some 340 feet of
water. No other nation is exploiting oil, gas, or hard minerals at
these depths. American companies are carrying out exploratory
drilling beyond the 200-meter isobath, and floating rigs are re-
portedly capable of drilling in 1,300 feet of water, but exploration is
not the same thing as exploitation.
It should also be noted that the United States Department of the
Interior has published leasing maps of the ocean floor off Southern
California in water depths ranging up to 6,000 feet. It has granted
exploitation leases to oil companies off the Oregon coast in 1,800
feet of water, and exploratory leases to drill core holes off the
Atlantic coast in depths of up to 5,000 feet. Do such actions mean
extension of the United States' rights to the shelf out to these
depths? The interactions of domestic and international law are ex-
tremely complex in this area. United States oil companies are
understandably anxious to secure exclusive rights against their
domestic competitors in order to carry out exploratory work on the
continental slope. In leasing these rights the federal government
implies it has jurisdiction over the seabed in question. But it is
stretching the rationale of the Geneva Convention to assume that a
decision by the United States Interior Department to issue leasing
maps of the sea floor in 2,000 feet of water qualifies as a demon-
stration of resource exploitability at that depth.
A related problem is that of reciprocity. It might be argued that
if a coastal state does not extend its shelf limits seaward as quickly
as possible other nations may begin commercial exploitation of the
seabed just beyond the coastal state's 200-meter isobath. These
fears could be allayed by the reciprocity principle. 46 If a foreign oil
company, for example, found it expedient to begin operations in
2,000 feet of water off the Texas coast, the very fact it had proved
46. Young, for example, states that "every coastal state would seem entitled to as-
sert rights off its shores to the maximum depth for exploitation reached anywhere in
the world, regardless of its own capability or of local conditions, other than depth,
which might prevent exploitation." The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
52 Am. J. Int'l L. 735 (1958).
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exploitability was possible at this depth would automatically extend
United States jurisdiction over its own adjacent shelf out to this
depth.
The problem of defining "adjacency" is a real one in cases where
shallow areas lie beyond the first 200-meter isobath seaward from
the coast. Several jurisdictional cases have arisen concerning "inter-
rupted" shelves, the most noted perhaps being those of the Nor-
wegian Trough, and of Forty Mile and Cortes Banks off Southern
California. 47 Two points seem clear. The first is that some shelves
extend up to 200 miles and more off the coast without a significant
break in depth. Such areas, at least out to the 200-meter isobath,
appertain to the coastal state. The second point is that in the case of
some narrow shelves, the presence of a canyon should not disqualify
the "outlying" shallow areas from inclusion within the shelf re-
gime.48 Two additional questions are also relevant. How great an
expanse of deep water must separate an "adjacent" shelf from
outlying platforms or sea mounts, in order for them no longer
to qualify as coming within the coastal state's sovereignty? Associ-
ated with this is the question of shelves extending 100 to 200 miles
or more from the coast. If, in these situations, it is found that
narrow belts of deep water separate the areas of less than 200-
meter depth from outlying shelves of shallow water, can the latter
be claimed as "adjacent" ?
The assumption that the framers of the Continental shelf Con-
vention had in mind some finite limits to the shelf obviates the pos-
sibility of extensions of national jurisdiction out to the median lines
of the oceans. 49 At present, such prospects are remote, but were it
proved feasible to exploit the hard mineral resources of the deep
ocean, some states might well lay claim to these areas in the hopes
at least of receiving revenues from licenses issued to foreign ex-
47. These Banks lie off the coast of Southern California, and have been the subject
of considerable debate as to whether they pertain to the California shelf. See Tubman,
The Legal Status of Minerals Located on or Beneath the Sea Floor Beyond the Con-
tinental Shelf, Exploiting the Ocean: Transactions of the Second Annual MTS Con-
ference and Exhibit 379 (1966) ; also Barry, Administration of Laws for the Explora-
tion of Offshore Minerals in the United States and Abroad, and Luce, The Develop-
ment of Ocean Minerals and the Law of the Sea, supra note 39.
48. It has been held by some writers that the criterion for inclusion of an "out-
lying" area as part of the shelf should be a geological one. Sea mounts, unrelated to the
shelf, could then be easily identified.
49. See Christy's map, based on the median line principle, which appears with The
Law of the Sea: The Future of the Sea's Resources, supra note 28.
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ploiters.50 Clearly it would seem to be both within our own national
interest, and the interests of the international community, to es-
tablish some fixed limits to the shelf beyond which national sov-
ereignty cannot extend, even on the basis of exploitability.
In 1969 the Geneva Convention becomes subject to a request by
any contracting party for revision. Pressure is already mounting
within the United States for some consideration of possible changes.
It is suggested here that the exploitability criterion be deleted in any
revised text, and that some fixed isobath and/or distance from shore
be taken to limit the outer boundary of the legally-defined shelf.
Any such revisions should (1) be consistent with United States
interests, and (2) be acceptable to the world community of nations.
Some coastal states wish exclusive rights to exploit the shelf's re-
sources off their coasts to whatever depths prove feasible; the world
community needs to maximize the freedom of the high seas over-
lying the shelf. The interplay of these concepts was fully recognized
in the Shelf Convention. As one proceeds further from the coast, the
freedom of use of the sea should become stronger.
What is proposed here is to separate the concept of the con-
tinental shelf from that of the continental slope-that portion of
the sea beyond the edge of the shelf were the incline is steeper down
to the deep-sea floor. Although geologically the average depth of
the break in slope is 133 meters,5' international law has picked 200
meters as the edge of the shelf. Beyond this depth is the slope. At
this stage in marine geology, it is not possible to determine an
average depth at which the slope meets the deep sea floor, and the
light rocks of the continent abut on the darker, more solid rocks of
the ocean basin. However, for purposes of clarifying regimes of the
sea bed, some fixed limit must be established, and it is suggested, at
least for the immediate future, that a depth of 2,500 meters be
taken as the seaward limit of the continental slope.52
It is also suggested that the sovereign rights of the coastal state
50. There is considerable debate as to the imminence of commercial deep ocean
mining. This division of opinion is reflected in the following two articles: Brooks, Deep
Sea Manganese Nodules 32 and Mero, Mineral Deposits in the Sea, The Law of the
Sea: The Future of the Sea's Resources 94 (1968).
51. Emery, Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor Socvereignty, 149, supra note 35.
52. Suggestions of the depths for the outer limit of the shelf range from 1,000
meters (Emery) to 2,500 meters (Mero). Marine geologists admit that knowledge to
date is insufficient to define the approximate isobath at which the lighter rocks of the
continent abut on the darker rocks of the ocean basins.
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to explore the natural resources of its adjacent continental shelf be
extended to the continental slope. The choice of the 2,500-meter
isobath would eliminate most of the problems of intervening can-
yons between the contiguous shelf and outlying areas. The rights of
the coastal state to grant or withhold consent for foreign research
activities would pertain to the shelf only, that is, out to the 200-
meter isobath. Beyond this point, foreign research concerning the
shelf could be conducted independently of the coastal state's consent.
Associated with this redefinition of "shelf" and "slope" would be
a compensating distance factor. For those states having a narrow
shelf, similar rights for exploration, exploitation, and jurisdiction
over foreign research would extend to a distance fifty miles offshore
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured, and for exclusive exploration and exploitation rights (but
not jurisdiction over foreign research activities concerning the sea
floor), to a distance 100 miles seaward of this baseline.
Decisions on the outer limits of the shelf are, of course, related
to questions of jurisdiction over the resources of the deep ocean
floor. Proponents of regimes for the ocean floor fall generally into
five categories. A first group are those who suggest a "wait and
see" attitude. These persons point out that within the foreseeable
future there are no apparent uses which can be made of the deep sea
floor and subsoil, and that until some problems arise we would be
better off to rely on the existing convention. The proponents of
change come under four headings: those favoring the "flag nation"
approach; those wishing an international registry system; those who
advocate internationalization of the deep seas' resources; and the
"national lake" proponents, mentioned earlier, who would simply
extend the jurisdiction of the coastal state out to the mid-point in
the oceans. 5
3
The basis of the "flag-nation" concept is that any exploiter of
deep-ocean resources would have his investment protected by the
nation under whose flag he is operating. He would be guaranteed
exclusive rights to the area in which he is operating against all other
claimants for a given period of time. These rights would presumably
be embodied in an international agreement, recognizing the rights of
53. See Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea-Security of Investment 2
The Int'l Lawyer 67 (1967). Several writers have pointed out that a "national lake"
regime might be the logical consequence of unlimited extension of the shelf limits on
the basis of exploitability. Countering this, however, is the argument that the criterion
of adjacency in the Shelf Convention would prevent unlimited expansion of the outer
limits of the shelf to the midpoint in the oceans.
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nations to protect their citizens in deep sea operations. Disputes
could go to the World Court or to some special arbitral body.54
A second approach would be to establish an international registry
(under the United Nations or some other body) to which exploiters
of the sea floor could apply for a certain area of seabed and for a
certain period of time.'5 A part of the revenue derived from the
subsequent mining operations could go to the registrant body, either
to compensate for administrative expenses and/or to distribute
wealth to other nations of the world community which share in the
ownership of the deep-sea resources.
An internationalization scheme would involve the control and
management of deep-sea mineral resources by some world body.
Not only would the registration provisions of the previous regime
prevail here, but also such an arrangement could provide an effective
overall management program and facilitate a rational allocation of
exclusive rights. By regulating production rates it could prevent the
wide fluctuations in mineral prices which so often accompany un-
restricted development.56
Two problems associated with the international approach are:
(1) on what basis would leases to mineral sites be distributed; and
(2) how would the revenues derived from the exploitations be dis-
tributed? Christy, who perhaps more than anyone else has studied
these issues, concludes that the optimal system for distributing leases
would be a competitive bidding system, as is carried on for oil
leases in the United States continental shelf. He prefers this to a
"first-come, first-served" system (as presumably would be followed
in an international registry system) on the ground that the latter
might result in excessive "land grabs" and in uneconomic production
by concerns seeking to make maximum use of their concessions with-
in the time period allotted to them. So far as distribution of wealth
is concerned, Christy feels that one factor which would make this
international regime acceptable to a majority of the world's nations
54. Ely, The Administration of Mineral Resources Underlying the High Seas, supra
note 35; American Policy Options in the Development of Undersea Mineral Resources,
2 The Int'l Lawyer 215 (1968).
55. Goldie, The Geneva Conventions, 273, supra note 35. See also Henkin, Law for
the Sea's Mineral Resources (Paper available from the National Council on Marine
Resources and Engineering Development, Washington 20500).
56. Christy, Alternative Regimes for Minerals of the Sea Floor, supra note 39; A
Social Scientist Writes to the International Lawyer on Economic Criteria for Rules
Governing the Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals, 2 The Int'l Lawyer 224 (1968). But
see also the objections to internationalization in Burke, A Negative Fiew, of Proposals
for United Nations Ownership of Ocean Mineral Resources, supra note 39.
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would be the provision that a portion of the revenue derived from
exploitation "could be earmarked for some widely accepted goal,
such as the overcoming of malnutrition. ' 57
The advantages of internationalization are offset by two draw-
backs: the lack of an effective organizational system at this time to
handle such a regime, and the fear on the part of the United States
and other maritime powers that such a regime would be contrary to
their national interests, and might stultify, rather than advance,
deep ocean developments. Since this nation is a leader in marine
affairs, it is argued, why should it jeopardize its freedom of action
by vesting even partial authority in an international agency whose
membership cannot be controlled by the United States?
While in the long run, these negative features may become min-
imized it is suggested that for the present the United States and
other maritime powers seek only a regime of international registry.
Under this arrangement the international machinery for dealing
with deep-ocean resources could be gradually developed without
being burdened at the outset with the awesome responsibilities of
managing the total resource exploitation. Since it appears likely that
some years will elapse before substantial development of deep-ocean
minerals will begin, there is ample time to work out the operational
details of such a registry system.
D. Scientific Inquiry
The conduct of scientific research beyond a coastal state's terri-
torial limits might be considered in terms of two general categories:
(1) the nature of the inquiry; and (2) the area of the sea in which
it is carried out. So far as the nature of the inquiry is concerned
there are three major types of scientific investigation. First is
general research into the composition of the marine environment,
the results of which are made available to all nations. Second is
investigation into the exploitation of certain marine resources, the
results of which may or may not become public. Third is research
carried on for military purposes; the results here are almost always
classified. Unfortunately, when research is being carried out by an
oceanographic vessel, it is often impossible for an interested foreign
state to determine to which category the operations apply, unless the
state has an observer on board the vessel.
The right of scientific inquiry by one country's vessels within
57. A Social Scientist Writes to the International Lawyer, supra note 56.
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another country's internal or territorial waters is prohibited without
the express consent of the foreign government. If the coastal state
claims exclusive fisheries rights in an extra-territorial contiguous
zone out to the twelve-mile limit, it may take the position that any
research being carried on by foreign vessels relating to the avail-
ability and exploitation of fisheries resources in that zone is con-
trary to the coastal state's interests.
A more serious problem concerns research involving a foreign
state's continental shelf. The Shelf Convention provides in Article
5 (8) that:
The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of
any research concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there.
Nevertheless, the coastal State shall not normally withhold its con-
sent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view
to purely scientific research into the physical or biological character-
istics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that the coastal
State shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be repre-
sented in the research, and that in any event the results shall be pub-
lished.
There are definitional problems here which may in time work to
the disadvantage of the United States. Up to now, practically all the
research carried on by scientists of one country in the waters over-
lying the shelf of another state has been conducted by United States
scientists off foreign coasts. While the number of refusals by foreign
governments to permit such research has been kept to a minimum,
the possibility of future difficulties is a strong one.5" To avoid un-
necessary suspicion by foreign governments the suggestion has been
made to delegate to some international scientific agency, such as the
International Council of Scientific Unions, the responsibility of de-
ciding whether requests for research by foreign vessels on a coastal
state's continental shelf are indeed bona fide scientific inquiry. The
agency would also undertake to ensure open publication of the
results of the inquiry."
58. In the summer of 1967 the Soviet Union turned down a request by the Univer-
sity of Washington for its oceanographic vessel, "Thomas G. Thompson," to conduct
research in the West Bering and Chuckcki seas. The Pueblo incident off North Korea
in January, 1968, may stimulate other countries to begin refusing research requests on
the grounds that the oceanographic vessels in question might be part of a military
intelligence net.
59. Schaefer, The Changing Law of the Sea-Effects on Freedom of Scientific In-
vestigation, The Law of the Sea: The Future of the Sea's Resources 113 (1968).
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Any attempts by nations to expand the areas of their legally-
defined continental shelf could, of course, affect the freedom of re-
search by foreigners in the overlying waters. While the United
States at present would seem to have little to gain from the provi-
sions of Article 5 (8) in terms of protecting its economic interests on
the shelf, it might well resist any attempts to delete this article in
possible future modifications of the Convention because of our mili-
tary interests. 0
Some writers have claimed that freedom of research is, in a
sense, a fifth freedom of the high seas since it qualifies under the
provision of Article 2 of the High Seas Convention as one of those
other freedoms "which are recognized by the general principles of
international law." 6' The inter-relationships of natural phenomena
throughout the world ocean make imperative the collection and
dissemination of data from all parts of the marine environment. It
would seem to be within the United States' interests to press for the
greatest possible degree of freedom of research beyond the twelve-
mile limits of all coastal states.
E. Military Operations
The two key goals sought by the United States military in the
sea are mobility and concealment. The United States Navy has
traditionally sought the maximum freedom of mobility in the sea
and in the airspace above it. To this end, its interests at times con-
flict with commercial fishing interests which desire an extension of
national authority some distance from shore as protection against
foreign competition.62
The Geneva Conventions did not guarantee to warships a clear
60. In a discussion of possible future vehicles which may operate off a country's
coast, Burke notes "telechiric (remote control) systems . . . robot systems, the various
inhabited submersibles capable of operating at continental shelf depths and deeper, the
special structures for prolonged habitation in submerged regions, and the various types
of buoy systems that are unmanned but either inert in the water or self-propelled."
Burke, Ocean Sciences, Technology, and the Future International Law of the Sea 42
(1965).
61. See Burke, Law and the New Technologies 206, and Goldie, The Geneva Con-
ventions 273, supra note 35. See also Burke, A Report on International Legal Problems
of Scientific Research in the Ocean (Paper available from the National Council on
Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Washington 20500).
62. An example of the conflicting military and fisheries interests was provided dur-
ing the debates on U.S. policy positions during the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Law of the
Sea Conferences. See, e.g., Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 751 (1960).
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right to pass through foreign territorial waters, 63 although they are
accorded the freedom of innocent passage through international
straits. Aircraft, however, have no right to overfly international
straits whose waters lie wholly within the territorial limits of the
adjacent state or states. Navy spokesmen are keenly aware of efforts
throughout the world ocean to close off or restrict the passage of
United States warships or planes. Extensions of territorial limits,
the delimitation of straight baselines, or efforts to intercept United
States vessels more than twelve miles off a foreign coast are actions
of great concern to the Department of the Navy.
There is one exception to adherence by the United States military
to the principle of the free use of the sea, namely, the temporary
closure of certain areas for the purpose of weapons testing. The
most noted examples were the establishment of "warning areas" in
the mid-Pacific during the early 1950's for hydrogen bomb testing. 4
These areas were up to 400,000 square miles in extent. In addition
to these, there have been temporary closures of much smaller areas
of the high seas by United States military authorities for the testing
of nuclear or other weapons.
The interests of the military with respect to the seafloor are
more complicated. The Navy might be expected to favor a narrow
continental shelf, since this reduces the extent of area off foreign
costs within which governments might seek to preclude American
scientific investigations. Yet the Navy would be very much concerned
over knowledge of an attempted emplacement by some foreign
country of data-gathering devices on the floor of the sea close to the
United States coasts but beyond the legally-defined shelf limits. This
same argument extends to sea mounts or other shallow areas beyond
the physical limits of the shelf. Since no nation has jurisdiction over
the floor of the deep sea, does it follow that any government can
install temporary or permanent military devices on these sea mounts
close to a foreign shore?
Two additional points are: (1) the suggestion of demilitarizing
63. Article 23 of the Territorial Sea Convention states: "If any warship does not
comply with the regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the terri-
torial sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made to it, the coastal
State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea." 3 Off. Rec. A/C 13/39
(1958). Within foreign territorial waters submarines are required to operate on the
surface and to show their flag.
64. See McDougal and Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Test in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 Yale L. J. 648 (1955).
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the deep ocean floor; and (2) the possible establishment of national
defense areas on the floor beyond continental limits. Attempts have
been made to find an analogy bewteen the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,
which provided that the continent be an area used exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and a possible future status for the deep ocean
floor. In view of the extensive undersea warfare programs of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and other powers, the prospects
for a demilitarization treaty for the deep sea bed do not appear
strong.65 Suggestions have been made, however, for an international
treaty banning the permanent emplacement of nuclear weapons or
other weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor, perhaps
beyond the shelf limits. 66 Such a treaty would be somewhat
analogous to the 1963 Treaty banning the use of such weapons in
space.
The designation of defense areas in the ocean floor might reduce
some elements of international uncertainty and possible incidents.
Goldie, for example, notes "states seeking to establish fixed defense
installations on sea mounts and on the seabed should give notice to
the effect that such are taken for defense purposes and are not to be
viewed as any longer within the general regime of the seabed and its
subsoil. ' '6 7 Since the number of sea mounts in the Pacific alone is
estimated to be in the thousands the acceptance of this suggestion
might well herald the beginnings of a far-ranging jurisdictional pat-
tern on the ocean floor.
III
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG USES OF THE SEA
The principal goals of legal regimes in the sea should be to maxi-
mize net benefits received from the marine environment and to pro-
vide a means for the equitable resolution of conflicts. In terms of
benefits the United States seeks five major types from its use of the
sea. Four of these are largely domestic: production of wealth, main-
tenance of natural security, acquisition of knowledge, and promo-
tion of public and private welfare. The fifth is international: the
advancement of world community interests. In our pursuit of these
65. For a positive approach see Michael, Avoiding the Militarization of the Seas,
New Dimensions for the United Nations: The Problems of the Next Decade 161 (1966).
66. Thus adding still another component to the problem of defining shelf limits.
67. Goldie, supra note 55. See also his Submarine Zones of Special Jurisdiction
Under the High Seas-Some Military Aspects, The Law of the Sea: The Future of the
Sea's Resources 100 (1968).
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objectives we often meet situations of conflicting interests-wealth
vs. public welfare, security vs. world community interests, science
for science's sake vs. science for military uses.
Because of the complexities of its objectives and of the role it
occupies as a major world power, the United States faces difficult
choices both in the ways it uses the marine environment and in the
types of jurisdiction it seeks to exert over that environment. In a
world of political, economic, and technological change, there are
various costs involved in rigid adherence to existing regimes of the
sea. Yet the costs of change might be even greater. Thus, two basic
problems present themselves. First, do apparent inadequacies in
the present law of the sea present serious problems at this time, or
are the difficulties more apparent than real? And, second, if there is
need to consider revisions in existing regimes, how might this best
be accomplished?
There probably are no direct answers to the first question. The
economic, scientific, and military uses we make of the sea are not at
the present time seriously hampered by inadequate international
rules and regulations. 6 8 Nor, apparently, are most other countries
concerned with the shortcomings of the present system.6 But even
if things are not serious now, there is reason to anticipate future
problems and prepare for the day when they will be upon us. It is
not so much the actual uses of the sea that will bring such problems
to the surface, but the political pressures associated with these uses
-expectations of food from the sea, competition among nations for
data acquisition, the demands of specialized interest groups within
our own country.
It is important that within the federal government we have a
strong locus for debate and decision-making on jurisdictional mat-
ters in the marine environment. This organization must be able to
weigh the conflicting interests, to assess possible trade-offs, and to
formulate and advance new concepts in the law of the sea when
necessary.
Beyond this is the international scene. Already voices are heard
favoring a Third Law of the Sea Conference to handle new or
unresolved problems. With the growing American emphasis on
68. With the exception that international rules have done nothing to alleviate gross
economic waste in international fisheries.
69. Two-thirds of the independent countries of the world have not seen fit to ratify
even one of the Geneva Conventions, nor have they officially explained the cause for
their refusal to do so. Apparently they have other problems to worry about than the
law of the sea.
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marine affairs, such a conference may in time be necessary, but
among some experts there is opposition to the idea. 0 Many of our
problems concerning the use of the sea are not dependent on chang-
ing existing regimes. International law is a slowly-evolving process;
new concepts developed in 1958 should be thoroughly tested before
still different regimes are introduced to the world community. New
laws should be given a chance to develop through custom rather
than more codifications.
In the face of these swirling developments we can identify two
basic principles. First, our development of the marine environment
must proceed as expeditiously as possible, consistent with our overall
national interest. There is much to be done in the sea within existing
international regimes. Second, we must remain alert to new concepts
in the law of the sea. In the complex world of today the United
States cannot afford to lose its leadership role in the realm of ideas
and ideals.
70. "I think it may take a hundred years for the law of the sea to recover from the
last two international conferences which dealt with it, and I would regard the im-
mediate call of another conference as an unmitigated disaster," McDougal, Interna-
tional Law and the La'w of the Sea, The Law of the Sea: Offshore Boundaries and
Zones 3 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
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